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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS v. 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO: 
AN INSURMOUNTABLE HURDLE FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Associated General Contractors v. City of San Fran-
cisco,! the Ninth Circuit held that a San Francisco ordinance2 
giving preference to minorities3 bidding on city contracts of 
$50,000 or less violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution! 
II. FACTS 
In response to allegations of discrimination in the awarding 
of San Francisco ("city") municipal contracts, the Board of Su-
pervisors, in 1982, commissioned a study by the Human Rights 
Commission. II The Commission reported finding specific claims 
1. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Kozinski, J.; the other panel members were 
Hug, J., and Beezer, J., concurring.) 
2. SAN FRANCISCO, CA, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12D (1984). 
3. [d. at §§ 12D.8(B)(2), 12D.8(B)(3), 12D.9(B)(1), 12D.3. Preferences were also pro-
vided for women-owned-businesses, and locally-owned-businesses. Associated Gen. Con-
tractors, 813 F.2d at 939, 942. 
4. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 944, discussing the U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 2. 
5. San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Investigation Into Minority and 
Women Business Participation in City Contracting, October 1983, reprinted in 2 San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission, Summary Report (abr. ed. 1983) [hereinafter 
HRC Report]. The report states: "While some public testimony included allegations of 
overt discrimination in the award of contracts, the majority of witnesses testified to alle-
gations of plrumed or benign exclusion from the notice and award process by virtually all 
City departments." [d. at vi. 
57 
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of discriminatory activities conducted by the city.6 Included in 
these allegation were statements by minority firms7 and individ-
uals working for the city.s Statistical data was also presented 
that showed an imbalance in the number of city contract dollars 
awarded to minority firms and the number of minority firms in 
the city.9 
Based on its findings, the Board of Supervisors passed City 
Ordinance 12D.I0 To further the attempt to aid minorities, the 
ordinance required the following: 1) each city department would 
set aside ten percent of its purchasing dollars for minority-
owned business (MBEs);ll 2) MBEs would get a five percent 
bidding preference for those contracts put out to bid;12 3) each 
city department would establish a yearly goal for the percentage 
of contracting dollars to go to MBEs;13 and 4) as an overall goal, 
thirty percent of the city's contracting dollars should go to 
MBEs.14 
The ordinance was challenged in the district court by Asso-
ciated General Contractors (AGC)115 which sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief16 to invalidate the ordinance op the grounds 
that its provisions violated the San Francisco Charter, 17 three 
separate federal civil rights statutes, IS and the Equal Protection 
6. Id. at 18-23. 
7.Id. 
8.Id. 
9. Id. at 27-3l. 
10. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 93l. 
11. SAN FRANCISCO, CA, ADMIN. CODE ch.12D § .8(b)2 (1984). 
12. Id. at § .8(b)(3). 
13. Id. at § .9(b)(1). 
14. Id. at § .3. 
15. Associated General Contractors of America is a Trade Association that was 
founded in 1918, has 108 local groups and consists of general contractors engaged in 
construction. 1 Encyclopedia of Associations, 105 (22 ed. 1988). 
16. Associated General Contractors v. City and County of San Francisco, 619 F. 
Supp. 334 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
17. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. CHARTER § 7.200 (1986) provides that contracts will be 
awarded to the lowest reliable and responsible bidder. 
18. AGC claimed violations of the following: 
(1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) which provides that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall' 
have the same right in every State and territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
2
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 
The city filed a motion for summary judgment.2o Finding no 
genuine dispute over a material issue of fact, the district court 
granted the city's motion for summary judgment.21 The district 
court's ruling also found that the city's affirmative action ordi-
nance was constitutional.22 The district court ruling included an 
extensive finding of facts.23 In response to the challenge made by 
the construction industry, the district court had specific evi-
dence that demonstrated an imbalance between the number of 
minority contracts awarded and the number of minority firms in 
the city.24 The district court decision was appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals which found the program unconsti-
tutional.211 
III. BACKGROUND 
As a tool to remedy racial discrimination, government enti-
ties have adopted affirmative action programs.28 Often these pro-
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) which states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United states or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
other party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress. 
(3) 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) which states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
20. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 336 
(N.D. Cal. 1985). 
21. Id. at 335. 
22.Id. 
23. Associated Gen. Contractor, 619 F. Supp. 334. 
24. Id. at 5-10. 
25. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 944. 
26. See Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (The court ordered de-
segregation of Alabama's state trooper force); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 
1974) (The court ordered desegregation of the Mississippi Highway Patrol); Local 93 Int'l 
Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct 3063 (1986) (The Court supported 
3
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grams have provided for preferential treatment based on race.27 
Individuals not eligible for preferential treatment have chal-
.lenged these programs because they are based on racial distinc-
tions prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.28 As a result, 
programs designed to remedy discrimination are themselves 
challenged as being discriminatory.29 
This portion of the article will focus on four areas: A. Devel-
opment of the test for reviewing affirmative action, B. The 
struggle of affirmative action, C. The position of the current 
Court, and D. The views of other circuits. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST FOR REVIEWING AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION. 
The United States Supreme Court first spoke of a stringent 
review of actions aimed at "discrete and insular minorities"30 in 
United States v. Carolene Products.3 ! Such actions will not be 
approved unless they serve a "compelling interest"32 and the 
means chosen are "narrowly tailored" to achieve that purpose.33 
This level of review has been classified as strict and very few 
legislative acts survive a strict analysis.34 It has been described 
as "strict in theory and fatal in fact."35 
Classifications that do not affect minority groups or funda-
mental rights are subjected to a rational basis scrutiny.36 Here 
the justification for the legistative act can be any reasonable 
efforts to redress discrimination by the city fire department in promotion of minority 
firefighters). 
27. See, e.g., Paradise, 767 F.2d at 1522, where one minority trooper was ordered 
promoted with each nonminority. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, extended to every person in Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 
1, 22 (1948). 
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for cases where nonminorities chal-
lenged programs for being discriminatory. 
30. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
31. Id. 
32. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980). 
33. Id. 
34. See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1000 (1978) [hereinafter 
L. Tribe]. 
35. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for 
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
36. See generally L. TamE, supra note 34 at 994. 
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means for implementing the goal of the act. s, It is rare that 
under such a test an act would be deemed unconstitutional.ss 
Occupying the middle ground, is the intermediate level of 
scrutiny which has been most often applied to distinctions based 
on gender.39 The classification must be based on an "important 
governmental interest"40 and be "substantially related" to that 
goal!l 
Affirmative action plans are generally designed to correct 
the effects of discrimination against "insular minorities. "42 Dur-
ing the era of school desegregation, the Court determined that 
the need to integrate the nation's public schools was a compel-
ling governmental interest!S Programs that took a child's race 
into consideration were viewed as a permissible use of a racial 
classification!4 The goal of school desegregation outweighed the 
objections of nonminority students that their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights had been violated!!! The use of race was jus-
tified since the government was attempting to remedy the effects 
of past discrimination!S Therefore, affirmative action programs 
whose goals are to remedy past discrimination are capable of 
passing the Court's strict scrutiny test!' 
One of the critical elements in justifying a race-conscious 
program is whether there has been racial discrimination!S In the 
school desegregation cases, the Court first determined that there 
37. Id. at 996. 
38. See generally J. NowAK, R ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONST1TUTIONAL LAW 530, (3d 
ed. 1986). [hereinafter J. NOWAK]. 
39. See generally L. TamE, supra note 34 at 1060-77. 
40. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 38 at 531-33. 
41. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court applied intermediate scru-
tiny to classifications based on gender. 
42. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
43. Brown v. Board of Educ., (Brown I) 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits separation of students because of 
their race. Id. 
44. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). A 
North Carolina anti-busing law was held invalid as preventing implementation of deseg-
regation plans. Id. 
45.Id. 
46.Id. 
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
48. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). 
5
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was illegal discrimination!9 This provided the compellng inter-
est to survive strict scrutiny analysis.lio Later, voluntary pro-
grams to remedy discrimination were implemented by different 
governmental entities. iiI These programs were voluntary in that 
no court order created the program and there was no judicial 
finding of past discrimination.1i2 When a nonminority challenged 
the program, the court was placed in the position of determining 
if there was a compelling need to implement the program. liS 
B. THE STRUGGLE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. 
In University of California Regents v. Bakke,li4 the Su-
preme Court ruled that a race-conscious program implemented 
by the Medical School at Davis, to increase the number of mi-
nority medical students, was unconstitional.1i1i 
The medical school had created a dual admission program. liS 
Nonminority applicants were summarily rejected if they had a 
grade point average of below 2.5. Minority applicants were not 
rejected if their average fell below 2.5 and were reviewed by a 
separate committee.1i7 Included in the Davis plan was the reser-
vation of sixteen seats in the first year class exclusively for mi-
nority candidates.lis The effect was that nonminorities could ap-
ply for only eighty-four of the one hundred seats in the first year 
class while minorities could apply for all one hundred.1i9 
49.Id. 
50. Fullilove V. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980). 
51. See Defunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The Defunis case was one of the 
first voluntary affirmative action programs reviewed by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
52. See, e.g., University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1978). 
(Faculty of the school instituted, on its own initiative, a dual admissions program). 
53. Id at 302. Justice Powell held, in Bakke, that any program employing race must 
demonstrate that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 
Id. 
54. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
55. Id. at 308-09. 
56. Id. at 273-74. For a discussion of preferential admissions programs, see gener-
ally, O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to 
Higher Education, 80 YALE L. REV. 699 (1971). 
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273-74. 
58. Id. at 289. 
59.Id. 
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The Bakke Court did not produce a majority opinion.6o 
Only Justice Powell rejected the plan on Equal Protection 
grounds.61 Since a classification had been made on race, Justice 
Powell applied strict scrutiny to the purpose of the program and 
the means employed to reach that goal.62 His analysis rejected 
the notion that a lower level of scrutiny should have been ap-
plied since the program discriminated against whites, a class 
which traditionally had not been subjected to discrimination.63 
Though Justice Powell believed that eliminating discrimina-
tion was a compelling governmental interest, he explained that a 
finding of past discrimination must be made by a competent 
governmental entity.64 The faculty of the medical school was not 
viewed as a governmental body competent to make a determina-
tion of past discrimination.615 
The program also failed Justice Powell's review because the 
means used to promote minority participation had too severe an 
impact on nonminorities.66 He pointed out that race can be used 
in a "neutral" way that falls short of barring participation of 
nonminorityapplicants.67 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun wrote a separate 
opinion.68 In their view, University of California Regents v. 
Bakke,69 was an affirmation of the government's authority to im-
plement affirmative action programs.70 The Justices rejected the 
60. Justice Powell rejected the school's program on equal protection grounds. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White approved 
the program on equal protection grounds. [d. at 379. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Ste-
vens, Stewart and Rehnquist rejected the program as violating Title VI or VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. [d. at 408. 
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. 
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
65. [d. at 309-10 n.59. Justice Powell was concerned that the decision was not made 
by a representative body of all of the community. 
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19. 
67. [d. Justice Powell approved the use of race, but only as one factor in reviewing 
an applicant. [d. at 316-19. 
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324. 
69. [d. at 265. 
70. [d. at 328, 337. The Justices pointed to North Carolina v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 
(1971), which permitted voluntary programs even in the absence of a judicial determina-
tion of discriminatoion. 
7
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notion that strict scrutiny was the proper level of review.71 They 
accepted a level closer to the intermediate leveP2 Applying this 
test, the Justices approved the medical school's plan.73 
More important to future decisions was the view of Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, that efforts to eradicate past 
discrimination do not have to be predicated on proof that the 
"recipients of preferential advancement have been individually 
discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a 
general class of persons likely to have been victims of discrimi-
nation."74 To require a specific contemporaneous showing of dis-
crimination would be self-defeating and would undermine efforts 
to achieve voluntary compliance with Equal Protection require-
ments.76 The Justices concluded that the medical school's plan 
could be justified by relying on national statistics which showed 
an imbalance betwen the percentage of minority doctors in rela-
tionship to the percentage of minority citizens.76 
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,77 a divided Court approved a Con-
gressional plan to increase the number of contracts being 
awarded to minority businesses.78 Congress was viewed as a gov-
ernmental entity competent to determine if there had been prior 
discrimination.79 Justice Brennan noted that Congress is not 
alone in its ability to determine if there had been past discrimi-
nation.80 State legislatures, which are anologous to the Congress, 
also possess the authority.81 Additionally, the state is free to 
delegate this authority as it sees necessary.82 
The Supreme Court still had to confront the question of 
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358-62. 
72. [d. at 359. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379. For a general discussion of preferential programs, see 
Sandalow, Racial Preference in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975). 
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363-64. 
75. [d. at 362. 
76. [d. 
77. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
78. [d. at 453-54. 
79. [d. at 473-80. This position was challenged in Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L. REv. 
453 (1987). The author contends the Court, by not requiring specific evidence of past 
discrimination, sent a confusing message to the lower courts on what proof is required to 
establish past discrimination. [d. at 457. 
80. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 366 n.42. 
81. [d. 
82. [d. 
8
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what is an adequate showing of disciminatory activities.83 The 
opportunity presented itself in Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education.84 
In Wygant,811 the Court invalidated a plan to protect minor-
ity teachers from layoffs.86 The plan fired nonminorities who had 
more seniority before firing minority teachers with less 
seniority.87 
The school board wanted to retain minority teachers who 
faced layoffs.88 To justify the plan, the school board expressed a 
desire to remedy societal discrimination by providing "role mod-
els"89 for minority students. The school board wanted to pre-
serve a balance between the number of minority students and 
minority teachers.90 
Again there was no majority opinion.91 Justice Powell con-
cluded that the school board was in error because it compared 
the wrong groups in determining if there had been discrimina-
tion in the hiring practices of the school district.92 The proper 
comparison should have been between the number of minorities 
holding positions and the number of minorities available in the 
relevant work force.93 
The requirement that an affirmative action program must 
be based on past discrimination was explained by Justice Pow-
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
84. Wygant v. Board of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
85.ld. 
86. ld. at 1859-60. The plan had the approval of the teacher's union. ld. at 1844. 
87. ld. The plan originated in 1972 as a result of racial tension in the community. 
ld. at 1844. 
88. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1859-60. In 1974, the school district violated the plan by 
firing minority teachers. ld. The union brought suit and the plan to protect minority 
teachers was approved by the state courts. ld. at 1844-45. 
89. ld. at 1846. 
90. ld. The school district showed that the percentage of minority teachers had 
fallen below the percentage of minority students. ld. at 1847. 
91. ld. at 1844. 
92. Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1847. 
93. ld. Justice Powell pointed to the Court's decision in Hazelwood School Dist. v. 
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood, a government imposed desegregation 
plan was reviewed. ld. The lower court's finding of discrimination was rejected because 
the government had not presented statistics comparing the number of teachers in the 
Hazelwood school district and the relevant work force. ld. The Supreme Court found the 
county in which the school district was located to be the relevant area. ld. at 310-13. 
9
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ell.94 Unless the reason for implementing the program. is demon-
strated, the remedies could be "timeless in their ability to effect 
the future."95 Since an affirmative action plan does discriminate, 
it is important that it have a limited lifespan.96 Once the prob-
lem of discrimination is remedied, the need for the race-con-
scious cure is over. 9'7 A program. based on general allegations of 
discrimination would not provide a means for determining when 
the program. is no longer needed.98 
No clear consensus has emerged from the United States Su-
preme Court on the issue of affirmative action.99 Although the 
Court has accepted that an affirmative action program. is a legal 
means of combating discrimination,loo it has not produced a ma-
jority view on the issue of what constitutes an adequate demon-
stration of past discrimination.101 A review of the current mem-
bers of the Court will show that a favorable balance exists for 
affirmative action. 
C. THE POSITION OF THE CURRENT COURT 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blaclonun have consist-
ently voted in favor of affirmative action. They approved the 
medical school's program. in University of California Regents v. 
Bakke,l°2 the Congressional plan in Fullilove v. Klutznick103 and 
the school board's efforts in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion.104·Employing an intermediate level of scrutiny, the Justices 
only require a showing of a "sound basis for calculating that mi-
nority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic."105 The 
Justices do not require any specific findings of past dicrimina-
94. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1847-48. 
97. Id. at 1847. 
98. Id. 
99. See Justice O'Connor's opinion in Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1853, for a discussion of 
the "fragmentation" of opinions. 
100. Id. 
101. See generally, Kende, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institu-
tions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHI L. REV. 581 (1986). The 
author suggests that there are five distinct views. Id. at 588. 
102. 438 U.S. at 379. 
103. 448 U.S. 448. 
104. 106 S. Ct. at 1863. 
105. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363-64. 
10
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tion when "there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a 
product of past discrimination.mos 
Justice Stevens' position has radically changed from his ini-
tial view expressed in Bakke,l°7 where he opposed affirmative ac-
tion programs.I08 He joined Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun 
in supporting the layoff plan of the school board in Wygant. I09 
His analysis focuses on whether the purpose of a program is to 
include or exclude minorities.110 When the remedial purpose is 
to include minorities in a societal activity, the program meets his 
initial approval.lll The program is then evaluated as to the harm 
to nonminorities.112 The standard employed by Justice Stevens 
is that of fairness.113 
Justice O'Connor held in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
cation and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara 
County, California,114 that in order to justify an affirmatvie ac-
tion plan, there must be a firm basis for believing that remedial 
action is required.111> This basis can be established by showing a 
statistical imbalance and does not require a demonstration of in-
stances of actual discrimination.11s According to Justice 
O'Connor, a showing of specific acts of discrimination would dis-
courage voluntary affirmative action programs.ll7 Additionally, a 
showing of actual discrimination would make the a governmen-
tal entity liable for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.118 
106. [d. 
107. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408. 
108. Justice Stevens adhered to a strict interpretation of § 601 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 which rejects all discrimination based on race. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408. 
109. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1867. 
110. For a discussion of Justice Stevens' views, see Note, Justice Stevens' Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987). 
111. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1869. 
112. [d. The Justice looks at two things: 1) assestment of the procedures used and 2) 
review of the nature of the harm. [d. 
113. [d. 
114. 107 S. Ct. 1442. In Johnson, the Supreme Court approved the use of gender as 
one factor in considering the promotion of a female employee of the County's transporta-
tion agency. [d. at 1446. 
115. [d. at 1461. 
116. [d. at 1462. 
117. [d. at 1463. Justice O'Connor explained that the Court has long supported vol-
untary efforts to eliminate discrimination. Id. 
118. [d. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an employer to 
11
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia con-
tinue to adhere to a strict interpretation of Title VII1l9 which 
forbids any use of race with regards to employment120 and the 
application of strict scrutiny in questions of Equal Protection.121 
D. THE VIEWS OF OTHER CIRCUITS 
The Sixth Circuit in Ohio Contractors Association v. 
Keip,122 upheld an affirmative action program which established 
goals for the percentage of state contracting dollars going to mi-
nority businesses.123 The legislative act which created the pro-
gram,124 did not contain any statement as to its purpose nor did 
it contain facts supporting findings of past discrimination.125 
The Court of Appeals upheld the program's constitutionality126 
because "its purpose and objective were absolutely clear from 
the text and the hearings and floor debate which proceeded final 
enactment."12'1 The Sixth Circuit looked beyond the legislative 
act128 itself to support a finding of past discrimination.129 The 
Sixth Circuit relied primarly on the district court's finding of 
disrcimination130 in the construction trade as determined in 
Ethridge v. Rhodes.131 Another source of information was a 
"special task force" that investigated the presence of discrimina-
refuse to hire or discriminate against any person because of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~ 
2(a) (1964). 
119. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465. 
120. See supra note 118. 
121. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1857. Justice Scalia's strict statutory interpretation is 
demonstrated in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465. 
122. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983). 
123. Id. at 168. 
124. OHIO REV. CODE § 123.151(C)(1) (1980). 
125. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170. 
126. Id. at 176. 
127. Id. at 170. 
128. OHIO REV. CODE § 123.151(C)(1) (1980). 
129. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170. The court compared the postion of the state legislators 
to that of the U.S. Congress in Fullilove. Id. Both are assumed to possess knowledge of 
past governmental activities which are concerned with investigations of the presence of 
discrimination. Id. Congress in Fullilove was assumed to benefit from all the past activi-
ties involving the elimination of discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 467. The Sixth 
Circuit held that state legislators also benefited from past efforts to eliminate discrimina-
tion. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170. 
130. Keip, 713 F.2d at 171. The court held that the state had participated with 
private industry and craft unions in a pattern of racially discriminatory activity. Id. 
131. 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
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tion in the awarding of contracts to minorities.132 The task force 
report showed that while MBEs constituted 7 percent of all 
businesses in Ohio, only 0.5 percent of the state's purchase con-
tracts were given to minorities.l33 The court determined this sta-
tistical comparison was indicative of an "imbalance in the 
contracts. "134 
The Eleventh Circuit in South Florida Chapter of the Asso-
ciated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitian 
Dade County, Florida/35 upheld the constitutionality of a pro-
gram granting preferential treatment to minorities in the 
county's contract bidding process.13S The court held that the dis-
trict court's finding of facts137 were not only adequate,138 but 
"binding unless clearly erroneous."139 The basis for justifying 
the affirmative action program was the imbalance between the 
minority population and both the number of minority businesses 
within the county and those MBEs receiving contracts.140 One of 
the major objectives of the program was to stimulate the minor-
ity business community and promote a sense of economic equal-
ity.l4l The Eleventh Circuit noted that discrimination can retard 
economic development of the minority community.142 Therefore, 
preferential programs may go beyond the awarding of contracts 
to minorities.143 A preferential program may help create more 
MBEs.144 
132. Keip, 713 F.2d at 171. The task force was established by the state attorney 
general and found that there was an imbalance in the amount of business the state did 
with minority groups. ld. 
133. ld. 
134. ld. 
135. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984). 
136. ld. at 848. The program included bid credits, set-asides and minority participa-
tion goals. ld. 
137. South Fla. Chapter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 552 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla. 
1982). 
138. South Fla. Chapter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 848 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
139. ld. at 848 n.2. 
140. ld. at 848. 
141. The Eleventh Circuit held that the County had a compelling interest to en-
courage growth in the minority business community. ld. 
142. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 857. 
143. ld. at 856. The plan had as one of its purposes the development and growth of 
economic and business opportunities for its community. ld. 
144. ld. 
13
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The approach employed by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
looked to the surrounding circumstances of each case.145 Taken 
under review by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits were the find-
ings of the district court/46 the legislative history of the act/47 
findings of investigative agencies148 and general population sta-
tistics which reflected a need to stimulate minority involvement 
in the economy of the community.149 
The Eighth Circuit in Catlett v. Missouri Highway and 
Transportation Commission/50 affirmed that the State Highway 
and Transportation Commission discriminated against women in 
its hiring practices.151 The court relied on statistical evidence 
showing an imbalance between the number of women hired and 
the "number expected to be hired."152 Additionally, testimonial 
evidence recounting instances of discrimination was used to 
show a "p;reponderance of evidence that the employer engaged 
in a pattern of unlawful discrimination."l53 Relying on past Su-
preme Court decisions/54 the Eighth Circuit determined that ei-
ther statistics or allegations of discrimination was sufficient to 
establish a pattern of discrimination.155 In Catlett/56 examples 
of specific discriminatory acts and the statistical disparity estab-
lished the fact that discrimination existed.157 
In Higgins v. City of Vallejo/58 a Ninth Circuit case de-
cided four months after Associated General Contractors v. City 
145. See supra notes 129 and 141 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra text accompanying notes 131 and 137. 
147. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
149. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 848. The Eleventh Circuit permitted the com-
parison of contracts awarded to minorities and general population figures. [d. 
150. 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1987). 
151. [d. at 1266. It was demonstrated that while women constituted forty-eight per-
cent of the relevant work force, less than ten percent had been hired. [d. 
152. [d. at 1265. 
153. [d. at 1266. Female applicants were discouraged from applying for positions 
and told there would be tasks inappropriate for females. [d. at 1265-66. 
154. [d. at 1265. The Eighth Circuit pointed to Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433 
U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977) that required a comparison of the relevant work forces and 
acceptance of antedotal evidence of discrimination. Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1265. 
155. Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1265. 
156. The individual claims for Title VII violations were rejected. [d. at 1264. The 
class claim alleging discrimination was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. [d. at 1265. 
157. [d. at 1265-66. 
158. 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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and County of San Francisco,1I19 an affirmative action program 
instituted by the City of Vallejo was reviewed and approved.160 
The court relied exclusively on the findings of the California 
Fair Employment Practices Commission.161 In its report, the 
Commission found that the city's hiring policy did not result in 
a government work force that reflected the racial make-up of the 
city.162 The report showed that while the city's population was 
approximately thirty percent minority, only 11.4 percent of the 
municipal work force was minority.16s Additionally, the court 
pointed to the hiring practices of the fire department and re-
viewed the number of minorities hired betweeen the years 1972 
and 1983.164 However, no relationship was made to the size of 
the relevant work force in the city during that period of time.16CS 
Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that "the record provides abundant 
evidence that the City of Vallejo engaged in past 
discrimination. "l66 
159. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d 922. 
160. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 352. The suit was filed by a nonminority firefighter who 
had been passed over for a promotion. [d. 
161. [d. at 356. The California Fair Employment Practices Commission conducted 
an investigation in 1973 and found the city's employment practices disfavored minori-
ties. [d. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
164. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356. The first black fire department employee was not 
hired until 1964. [d. 
165. The court relied, instead, on the fact that in the history of the fire department, 
only three blacks had ever held the position. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356. 
166. [d. In addition to the cases cited above, see Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 
F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) A plan to encourage promotion of minorities and women in 
the D.C. police force was challenged and remanded to the trial court for a determination 
of evidence of discrimination with the proper standard to be a "greater quantum of sta-
tistical evidence, evidence of prior discrimination or some combination."; Edinger v. City 
of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986) Plan to increase minority participation in City 
of Louisville contracting invalidated because the Board had offered only general popula-
tion statistics to support a claim of discrimination. The court held that general popula-
tion statistics were sufficient when combined with independent studies or evidence of 
historical discrimination." Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987) Rejected a 
program to increase the number of minorities hired by the D.C. fire department. There 
had been no showing of discrimination by plaintiffs. Relying entirely on hiring statistics, 
the court found evidence of a nondiscriminatory attitude towards hiring minorities. Brit-
ton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1987) Invalidated a 
school board plan to protect minority teachers from layoffs. The school board relied on 
the same "role model" theory as was used in Wygant. The court rejected the plan be-
cause no additional evidence of discrimination was presented. Additionally, hiring statis-
tics revealed no discrimination in the school district's hiring procedure. 
In J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), a minority 
business enterprise preference program was invalidated by the court because of a failure 
15
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit, in Associated General Contractors v. 
City and County of San Francisco,167 utilized a three part test 
for reviewing the Equal Protection issue: 1) Did the city have 
the authority to establish an affirmative action program which 
was racially biased on its face? 2) Were the city's findings of 
discrimination adequate? 3) Were the means selected ade-
quate?168 
While the court concluded that the city had the authority to 
implement an affirmative action program,169 the court found 
that the city failed to adequately demonstrate a finding of dis-
crimination.170 Also, the court rejected the means employed by 
the city.l7l 
to show prior discrimination. Id. at 1358. The City of Richmond used general population 
figures and five hours of public hearings to support its claim of discrimination in the 
awarding of city contracts. Id. The dissent of Judge Sprouse explores the question of 
whether statistics comparing relevant work forces always accurately portrays the pres-
ence of discrimination. Id. at 1362. Discrimination may also impact the relevant work 
force of the community. Id. at 1363. General population statistics may more precisely 
reflect the effect of discrimination. Id. at 1365. 
In Croson, only two-thirds of one percent of contracts were awarded to minority 
contractors while fifty percent of the population of Richmond was minority. Id. at 1364. 
Judge Sprouse noted that these figures "[break] the bounds of the sometimes suspect 
'science' of statistics and is probative of a good deal more that general discrimination." 
Id. at 1365. 
This view was echoed in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1442, by Justice O'Connor. In Johnson, 
women applying for the employment position under review "had not been strongly moti-
vated to seek training or employment." Id. at 1463. As a result, the statistical compari-
son of workers employed and relevant work force did not suggest discrimination. Id. 
Contradicting this statistical conclusion was the fact that prior to the promotion under 
review in Johnson, none of the 238 positions had ever been held by women. Id. Acknowl-
edging the inconsistency, Justice O'Connor concluded that an affirmative action program 
can be based on efforts to remedy "past apparent discrimination." Id. at 1464. 
The basis for demonstrating past apparent discrimination is a determination of 
whether the number of minorities in a job classification is at a reasonable level in com-
parison with "estimates of the number of persons from these groups in the area work 
force who can meet the educational and experience requirements for employment." Id. at 
1464. I 
167. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
168. Id. at 928. 
169. [d. at 929. 
170. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931-32. 
171. Id. at 938. 
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A. DID THE CITY HAVE AUTHORITY? 
The question of authority was decided without an opposing 
argument.172 The Ninth Circuit relied on Justice O'Connor's 
opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educationl73 which held 
that a state or its political subdivision has the authority to de-
termine if it is "denying its citizens equal protection of the law 
and if so, to take corrective stepS."!74 Accordingly, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged the city's authority to establish an affirm-
ative action program.1715 
B. WERE THE CITY'S FINDINGS ADEQUATE? 
The burden was placed on the city to justify its affirmative 
action program.178 "At a minimum, the state or local government 
must be acting to remedy government-imposed discrimination, 
perpetuated by it."177 Emphasis was placed on the view that the 
city itself must have discriminated by its own method of award-
ing contracts.17S The Ninth Circuit noted that societal dis-
criminaton as the justification for a race-based program was in-
adequate.179 With that perspective established, the court 
reviewed the city's findings regarding past discrimination. ISO 
The city relied extensively on the findings of the Human 
Rights Commission.18l The Commission reported finding specific 
claims of discriminatory activities conducted by the city in the 
awarding of its contracts.IS2 Included in these allegations were 
statements by minority firmslS3 and individuals working in the 
172. Id. at 929. 
173. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
174. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 929. 
175.Id. 
176. Id. at 930. The Ninth Circuit held that the city could be acting only to "correct 
their own past wrongdoing." Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. The Ninth Circuit was concerned that at this low level of government, mea-
sures were being decided not according to the rules of justice and the rights of a minority 
party but by "a superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." Id. 
179. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 930. Societal discrimination is "dis-
crimination not traceable to its own actions." Id. 
180.Id. 
181. Id. at 931 n.15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 5 and text accompanying notes 5-9. 
183. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 18-23. 
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city that discrimination was present.184 Statistical data was also 
presented showing an imbalance in the number of city contract 
dollars awarded and the number of minority firms in the city.185 
The Ninth Circuit objected to the city's use of statistics in 
its effort to demonstrate discrimination.18B Specifically, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the city's attempt to relate the number of 
MBEs awarded city contracts to the total number of all MBE 
businesses in the city.187 According to the court, the comparison 
should be limited to only those MBEs that provide the services 
required by the city.18B The Ninth Circuit felt that the compari-
son presented by the city was not between relevant groupS.lS9 
Furthermore, the city failed to include subcontractors in its 
comparison.19o Including subcontractors would have shown the 
total dollar amount going to minorities.191 This was fatal because 
the court could find no proof that minority subcontractors were 
not receiving city dollars.192 
While the Ninth Circuit praised the efforts of the city's in-
vestigators, the court nevertheless concluded that the city failed 
to uncover any finding of prior discrimination since no discrimi-
nation against minorities by city officials or under color of the 
city's authority had been shown.193 
C. WERE THE MEANS SELECTED APPROPRIATE? 
Relying on Regents of University of California u. Bakke,194 
the Ninth Circuit employed the requirement that the "means 
adopted must be narrowly tailored. "195 Again the city failed to 
pass the court's scrutiny because the program encompassed all 
184. [d. 
185. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 27-31. 
186. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931. 
187. [d. at 933. 
188. [d. at 933·34. 
189. [d. 
190. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 933. 
191. [d. The HRC Report showed that in 1982, 19.3 percent of the city's contracting 
dollars went to construction subcontractors. [d. at 933 n.22. 
192. [d. at 933. 
193. [d. at 931-32. 
194. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
195. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 934. 
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aspects of city contracting.196 The court was concerned with the 
fact that the ordinance "casts such a wide net"197 since it was 
not limited to one area of contracting.19S The fault of a program 
encompassing all aspects of the city's contracting needs was that 
the distribution of available MBEs was uneven.199 Some busi-
ness areas have very few MBEs to draw from.200 Similarlly, the 
Panel noted that the distribution of non-MBEs was not uni-
form.201 As a result, "a non-MBE business in an industry heavily 
dependent upon city procurement where MBEs have a signifi-
cant share of the market, may well be destroyed."202 With this 
potential for destruction of non-MBE enterprises, the Ninth 
Circuit faulted the city's plan because it offered no means to 
ameliorate such a harsh effect.203 
The court also determined that an administrative procedure 
designed to safeguard non-MBEs against the harsh effects of in-
equitable application was missing.204 A proper administrative 
remedy would have provided a mechanism through which non-
MBEs could raise the objection that the city's efforts: 1) did not 
apply to their industry; 2) would have too harsh an impact on 
the non-MBE; or 3) was being used by MBEs to reap a wind-
fall.20G The Ninth Circuit determined that such a safeguard was 
"entirely lacking" in this ordinance.206 
Finally, the court determined that other untested means are 
available for remedying the limited participation of MBEs in the 
contracting process.207 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the city 
196. [d. at 936. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. at 936. The city contracts included "everything from construction and con-
sulting to interpreting and book binding." [d. 
199. [d. 
200. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 936. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. 
203. [d. at 937-38. The plan in fact does contain provisions for waiving the require-
ment when it can be shown that compliance is not feasible or "sufficient qualified Minor-
ity and Women Business Enterprises capable of providing the goods or services required 
are unavailable in the market area of the project." SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE ch. 12D § 12D:9(2)(a) (1980). 
204. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 937-38. 
205. [d. at 938. 
206. [d. 
207. [d. at 938-39. Some of the court's suggestions included eliminating arbitrary 
imposition of bonding and insurance requirements, increasing the amount of advertising 
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had not explored less drastic means.208 Thus, until such means 
are explored by the city and shown to have failed, the use of bid 
preferences cannot be justified.209 
In summary, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordi-
nance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
tion210 because the city had not demonstrated an adequate find-
ing of discrimination in the method it was using to award 
contracts211 and had not explored less restrictive means of reme-
dying the alleged problems associated with minority contract 
awards.212 
v. CRITIQUE 
The City of San Francisco's affirmative action program was 
found to be unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit on the basis 
that the city failed to show "any discrimination against minori-
ties by city officials or under color of the city's authority."213 The 
court relied extensively on the language of Justice O'Connor in 
Wygant.214 Yet the Wygant Court made clear the Supreme 
Court's position that specific acts of discrimination are not only 
unnecessary but unrealistic given the liability exposure that 
such an admission would create.215 The Ninth Circuit's position 
requiring "the governmental entity itself discriminated"216 con-
tradicts the Wygant view.217 "The imposition of a requirement 
that public employers make findings that they have engaged in 
illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action 
programs would severely undermine public employers' incentive 
to voluntarily meet their civil rights obligations."218 Yet the 
of available contracts and providing educational programs for minority businesses. Id. 
208. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F. 2d at 938. 
209. Id. at 939. The position taken by the city was that earlier efforts to promote 
minority particpation had failed. Petition for Rehearing for, Appellant at 6, Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
210. Id. at 944. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 931-32 (9th 
Cir. 1987). 
214. Id. at 930. 
215. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855. 
216. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 930. 
217. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855. 
218. [d. 
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Ninth Circuit objects to the city's program because the city 
failed to demonstrate specific acts of discrimination.219 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding, the district court 
found sufficient evidence of discrimination on the part of the 
city.220 The district court, even without the guidance of the Wy-
gant decision, compared the percentage of contracts awarded to 
minorities with the number of minority firms available in the 
relevant work force.221 The statistics showed that while 30.59 
percent of all construction firms in San Francisco are minority 
owned, they were awarded no more than 2.8 percent of all city 
contracts.222 In spite of this conclusion, no where does the Ninth 
Circuit refer to the district court's findings of fact.223 
Also overlooked by the Ninth Circuit was the report submit-
ted by the Human Rights Commission (HRC)224 showing that 
twelve of the forty-two individuals or firms which testified 
before the Commission expressed specific allegations of racial 
discrimination.225 Additionally, testimony of city personnel re-
vealed individual department practices made it virtually impos-
sible for new firms to break into the contracting process.226 
The city had made attempts to encourage minority partici-
pation in city contracting through programs prior to the pro-
gram in the instant case.227 Efforts to aid MBEs by requiring 
nonminority contractors to use MBEs as subcontractors had 
failed.228 The HRC documented that in eleven cases, MBE sub-
219. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931-32. 
220. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 340 
(N.D. Cal. 1985). 
221. [d. at 340 n.3. 
222. [d. 
223. The failure of the Ninth Circuit to discuss the district court's finding of facts 
raises the issue of when an Appeals Court can overrule a district court's finding of facts. 
The position of the Supreme Court was discussed in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 
U.S. 273 (1982). The Pullman Court held that a district court's finding of facts can not 
be overruled unless they are shown to be "clearly erroneous." [d. at 287. 
224. HRC Report, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
225. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14. 
226. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 31. 
227. Earlier attempts by the city included legislation aimed at fighting employment 
discrimination by firms contracting with the city. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12B (1978). 
Additionally, the city attempted to encourage the use of minority subcontractors by 
those contracting with the city. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12B(9) and 12 (B)4(c)(5) 1980. 
228. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334 
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contactors were dropped by the prime contractors once the con-
tracts were awarded.229 
The HRC Report discussed the significance and necessity of 
supporting efforts to encourage the use of MBEs as primary con-
tractors. The business advantages are: 1) a provision for over-
head expenses is incorporated into the prime bid but not the 
subcontractor's bid; 2) profit is greater for the prime; and 3) the 
prime contractor selects, utilizes, and ultimately pays the 
subcontractors.230 
Since the efforts to aid MBE had failed,231 the city devised a 
program that direclty encouraged minority participation in city 
contracting.232 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding, the city 
had explored less drastic means which were found to be 
ineffective.233 
The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of MBE participation 
in city contracting as subcontractors was sufficient to refute 
charges of racial discrimination.234 This reasoning is disturbing 
because it would allow for discrimination on the level of primary 
contractors as long as it can be shown that some city dollars are 
trickling down to minority subcontractors.235 
Finally, the 'view that the city must demonstrate specific 
acts of discrimination to support the imposition of an affirmative 
action program is not consistent with the views expressed by 
other Circuit Courts of Appeals.236 
(N.D. Cal. 1985). Finding of facts and conclusions of law, Finding 9. 
229. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14. 
230. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 30. 
231. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334, findings of facts and con-
clusions of law, Finding 9. 
232.Id. 
233. Id. Additionally, there is no requirement that the least restrictive means be 
employed. Fullilooe, 448 U.S. at 508. 
234. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 933. 
235. The advantages for promoting minority participation in the city contracting 
process as prime contractors was discussed by the Human Rights Commission. HRC Re-
port, supra note 5, at 30. 
236. The other Circuit Courts have accepted statistical evidence and anecdotal 
claims of discrimination to support the need for affirmative action programs. See supra 
text accompanying notes 122-66. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For the past ten years, the Supreme Court has both recog-
nized the need for affirmative action programs and struggled 
with the method for analyzing whether such a program was con-
stitutional. As one commentator has pointed out, "[flew issues 
are more starkly divisive in our politics than affirmative action 
... [n]o one standard of review or formula applying it [has] 
ever captured five votes ... [b]ut all nine Justices [have] said 
that classifications favoring racial minorities may sometimes be 
tolerated . . . . "237 
The Ninth Circuit in Associated General Contractors v. 
City and County of 'San Francisco,238 employed the three part 
test used by the Supreme Court in reviewing affirmative action 
programs.239 The court erred in its application of the test to the 
specific facts of this case.240 The Ninth Circuit's criterion for 
demonstrating past discrimination is out-of-step with its own 
view, as expressed in other Ninth Circuit cases,241 as well as de-
velopments in other circuits242 and the Supreme COurt.243 This 
decision of the Ninth Circuit stands alone in requiring a demon-
stration of specific acts of discrimination by the governmental 
agency.244 
The Ninth Circuit ignored the findings of discrimination by 
237. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 
HARv. L. REV. 1, 118 (1986). 
238. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). 
239. [d. at 929. The three-part test consisted of the following: 1) Did the city have 
the authority to establish the program? 2) Were the city's findings of discrimination 
adequate? 3) Were the means selected adequate? [d. 
240. The Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that, statistically, the city demon-
strated that in the construction industry, at least, there was an imbalance in the number 
of contracts awarded to minority firms. Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334, 
340 n.3. 
241. See, e.g., Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987). See text ac-
companying notes 158-66. 
242. See text accompanying notes 122-66 and note 166. 
243. See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853. The Wygant decision confirmed that evi-
dence of specific acts of discrimination are inconsistent with its desire to encourage vol-
untary eradication of discrimination. [d. 
244. The liability exposure that would result from such admissions has been high-
lighted as the primary reason for not requiring such specific admissions. See Johnson, 
107 S. Ct. at 1463. 
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the Human Rights Commission and the district court245 which 
supports the conclusion that even statistical data required by 
Wygant will not satisfy this court's requirement for a demon-
stration of past discrimination. The Ninth Circuit decision raises 
the barrier for affirmative action programs to insurmountable 
heights. Whether any affirmative action program could pass the 
scrutiny of the Ninth Circuit is in question after this decision. 
Christopher Windle* 
245. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14, 31. The HRC Report provided anecdotal 
and statistical evidence of discrimination. Id. The district court found statistical evi-
dence of discriminatory practices in the methods used by the city in awarding its con-
tracts. Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334, 340 n.3. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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